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I. DEFINITIONS
The following definitions are given to acquaint the
reader with some of the terms commonly encountered in the
field of cryptography.
Cryptology is the branch of knowledge that deals with
the development and use of all forms of secret communication,
Cryptography is the branch of cryptology that deals
with secret writing.
Cryptanlaysis is the branch of cryptology that deals
with the analysis and solution of cryptographic systems.
A Cipher is a cryptographic system which conceals
,
in a cryptographic sense, the letters or groups of letters
in the message or plaintext .
Enciphering is the operation of concealing a plaintext,
and the result is a cipher text , or in general a cryptogram .
Deciphering is the process of discovering the secret
meaning of a cipher text.
A key is the variable parameter of a cipher system,
prearranged between correspondents , which determines the
specific application of a general cipher system being
used. The use of keys permits almost endless variations
within a given cipher system. In fact, the value of a
specific cipher system is based on how hard it is for an
"enemy" to break a cryptogram or series of cryptograms,
assuming he knows the complete details of the system but
10

lacks the keys which were used to encipher the cryptograms
originally.
A code is a cryptographic system which substitutes
symbol groups for words, phrases, or sentences found in
the plaintext. It involves the use of a codebook, copies
of which are kept by each correspondent.
Encoding is the operation of concealing a message
using a code.
Decoding is the process of recovering an encoded
message.
A code differs from a cipher because a code deals with
plaintext in variable size units, such as words or phrases,
while a cipher deals with plaintext in fixed size units,




Since there is no way of making data communication
links physically secure, particularly if some form of radio
transmission is involved, encryption is the only practical
method of protecting the transmitted data. In the commer-
cial world and nonmilitary parts of government, there is a
growing need for encryption. This need for encryption is
not just to satisfy the legal requirements for privacy,
but also to protect systems from criminal activities.
At the present time, communication systems seem to be
going towards digital means. There are already in use
digital systems for data communications as well as for
public services such as the telephone system.
The present work was intended to study the possibility
of using a digital computer to realize cryptographic systems.
Further, this computer can be envisioned as part of a digital
communication system, mainly to do cryptography and to
implement suitable error correcting codes. The DEC
PDP-11/40 minicomputer was used to do this study.
Through this work, three cryptographic systems were
designed, ranging from a simple substitution cipher to a
data-keyed cipher. On the latter the message itself con-
stituted the key to modify other characters. Very signi-
ficant results were obtained from it in the sense that it
gives rise to a text where its characters were nearly
12

equiprobable. Further, a cyclic error correcting code





Some of the earliest practical crytographic systems
were the monoalphabetic substitution systems used by the
Romans [Ref. 1] . In these, one letter is substituted for
another. For example, an A might be replaced by a C.
By the fifteenth century, an Italian by the name of Alberti
came up with a technique of cryptoanalyzing letters by
frequency analyses. As a result, he invented probably the
first polyalphabetic substitution system using a cipher
disk. Thus, he would rotate the disk and encode several
more words with the next substitution alphabet.
Early in the sixteenth century Trithemius, a Benedic-
tine Monk, had the first printed book published on cryp-
tology. Trithemius described the square table or tableau
which was the first known instance of a progressive key
applied to polyalphabetic substitution. It provided a
means of changing alphabets with each character. Later in
the sixteenth century, Vigenere perfected the autokey; a
progressive key in which the last decoded character led to
the next substitution alphabet in a polyalphabetic key.
These were basically the techniques that were widely applied
in the cryptomachines in the first half of the twentieth
century. Various transposition techniques have been em-
ployed including the wide use of changing word order and




In 1883, Auguste Kerckhoffs, a man born in Holland but
a naturalized Frenchman, published a book entitled La
Cryptographic Militaire . In it, he established two general
principles for cryptographic systems. They were:
1. A key must withstand the operational strains of
heavy traffic. It must be assumed that the enemy
has the general system. Therefore, the security
of the system must rest with the key.
2
.
Only cryptoanalysts can know the security of the
key. In this, he infers that anyone who proposes a
cryptographic technique should be familiar with
the techniques that could be used to break it.
From these two general principles, six specific require-
ments emerged in his book:
1. The key should be, if not theoretically unbreakable,
at least unbreakable in practice.
2. Compromise of the hardware system or coding tech-
nique should not result in compromising the security
of communications that the system carries.
3. The key should be remembered without notes and
should be easily changeable.
4. The cryptograms must be transmittable by telegraph.
Today this would be expanded to include both digital
intelligence and voice (if voice scramblers are




5. The apparatus or documents should be portable and
operable by a single person.
6. The system should be easy, neither requiring
knowledge of a long list of rules nor involving
mental strain.
In 1917 Gilbert S. Vernam, a young engineer at American
Telephone and Telegraph Company, using the Baudot code
(teletype) invented a means of adding two characters
(exclusive or) . Vernam 's machine mixed a key with text
as illustrated by the following:
Clear Text 10 111
Key 10 10
Coded Character 1110 1
To derive the text from the coded character, all that was
required was the addition of the key again to the coded
character.
Coded Character 1110 1
Key 10 10
Clear Text 10 111
His machines used a key tape loop about eight feet long
which caused the key to repeat itself over a high volume
of traffic. This allowed cryptoanalysts to derive the
key. William F. Friedman, in fact, solved cryptograms
using single- loop code tapes but appears to have been
16

unsuccessful when two code tapes were used. Major Joseph
Om Mauborgne {U.S. Army) then introduced the one-time
code tape derived from a random noise source. This was
one of the first theoretically (and in practice) unbreaka-
ble code systems. The major disadvantage of the system
was the enormous amounts of key required for high-volume
traffic.
During the 192 O's and 1930's, the rotor-code machines
having five and more rotors , each rotor representing a
scrambling step, were developed. They proved relatively
insecure, requiring only high-traffic volume for the
cryptoanalyst to break them. In fact, the Japanese used
a code-wheel-type machine for their diplomatic communica-
tions well into World War II. It was vulnerable to crypto-
analysis, and William F. Friedman and his group not only
solved the code but reconstructed a model of the machine
to break Japanese diplomatic correspondence. Thus, Presi-
dent Roosevelt and others were aware of the impending break
in diplomatic relations with Japan just prior to World
War II.
The code wheels (or rotors) were nothing more than
key memories storing quantities of key which could easily
be changed by interchanging rotor positions, specifying
various start points for each rotor, and periodicaly re-
placing a set of rotors. This provided a means of producing
what is called key leverage.
17

The advent of electronic enciphering systems substan-
tially replaced the mechanical cryptographic machines.
And, further the appearance and fast development of digital
logic is offering new tools to modern crypto designers.
References (2) , (3) and (4) from the Bell System Technical
Journal provide interesting literature on Digital Data
Scramblers.
Today, the most commonly encountered commercial crypto-
system is based on the "shift register," [Ref. 5] . Despite
design variations, shift registers are used as pseudorandom
key generators. The implementation of data scramblers with
pseudorandom sequences using logic circuits is suggested
by Twigg [Ref. 6], and Henrickson [Ref. 7]. The idea of
shift register sequences is well treated by Golomb [Ref. 8]
.
The relative weakness of pseudorandom codes is pointed by
Meyer and Tuchman [Ref. 9], from I.B.M. For high security,
Torrieri [Ref. 10], and Geffe [Ref. 11], introduce the idea
of using nonlinear as well as linear operations. The theory
of nonlinear operations is also contained in Ref. 8.
Finally, the appearance of modern high speed digital
computers has risen speculation as how best to apply its
capabilities since it is available for both cryptography
and cryptanalysis. Even the newest microprocessors are
reported [Ref. 12], as being designed for encription
devices.
A very comprehensive historical exposition with some
descriptive technical content is the book by Kahn, The
18

Codebreakers [Ref. 13], which appeared in 1967. Of special
interests are the sections devoted to the cryptographic
agencies of the major powers, including the United States.
For the interested reader in the field of cryptography,
the American Cryptogram Association publishes "The Crypto-
gram," a bimonthly magazine of articles and cryptograms.
The hobby of solving cryptograms provides a fascinating
intellectual challenge. Patient analysis and flashes of
insight, combined with the enthusiasm of uncovering




IV. THEORY OF SECRECY SYSTEMS
A. INTRODUCTION
A secrecy system is defined as a set of transformations
of one space (the set of possible messages) into a second
space (the set of possible cryptograms) . Each particular
transformation of the set corresponds to enciphering with
a particular key. The transformations are supposed rever-
sible (non-singular) in order to obtain unique deciphering
when the key is known together with the specific system
used.
Each key and therefore each transformation is assumed
to have an a priori probability associated with it. Simi-
larly each possible message is assumed to have an associated
a priori probability of being selected for encryption.
These two represent the a priori knowledge of the situation
for a cryptoanalyst trying to break the cipher.
To use the system a key is first selected and sent
to the receiving point. The choice of a key determines a
particular transformation in the set forming the system.
Then a message is selected and the particular transformation
corresponding to the selected key is applied to the message
to produce a cryptogram. This cryptogram is transmitted to
the receiving point by a channel where it can be intercepted
by an undesired agent. At the receiving end, the inverse
of the particular transformation is applied to the cryptogram
20

to recover the original message. Figure 1 provides the
















Figure 1. A Secrecy System.
If the referred undesired agent intercepts the trans-
mitted cryptogram through a channel, he can calculate from
it and from his possibel knowledge of the system being used,
the a posteriori probabilities of the various possible
messages and keys which might have produced this cryptogram.
This set of a posteriori probabilities constitutes his
knowledge of the key and message after the interception.
21

The calculation of the a posteriori probabilities is the
generalized problem in cryptanalysis.
C. PERFECT SECRECY
Shannon [Ref
. 14] , provides for concepts such as
entropy, redundancy, equivocation and many others that are
helpful for evaluating secrecy systems.
Let us assume that the message space is constituted
by a finite number of messages P.. , P« , . .., p with anla n
associated a priori probabilities p(P
n
), p(P 9 ), . .., p(P )
and that these messages are mapped into the cryptogram
space by the transformation
C_. = T. P.
J i 3
The cryptanalyst intercepts a particular C . and can
then calculate the a posteriori conditional probability
for the various messages, p(P./C.). It seems natural now
to define that one condition for perfect secrecy is that for
all C
.
, the a posteriori probabilities of the messages P
given that C. has been received, are equal to their a
priori probabilities, independent of these values. Or,
from an information theory viewpoint, intercepting the
cryptogram has given the cryptanalyst no information about
the message; he just knows that a message was sent. On
the other hand, if this condition is not satisfied there
will exist situations in which the cryptanalyst has certain
22

a priori probabilities and certain choices of key and
message thus preventing perfect secrecy to be achieved.
Shannon [Ref
. 15] , gives a theorem stating the necessary
and sufficient conditions for perfect secrecy, namely
p(C/P) = p(C)
for all the messages (P) and all the cryptograms (C)
.
Where
p(C/P) = Conditional probability of crypto-
gram C to occur if message P is
chosen.
p(C) = Probability of obtaining cryptogram
C for any cause.
Stated in other terms, the total probability of all
keys that transform P. into a given cryptogram C is equal
to that of all keys transforming P. into the same C, for
all P. , P . and C.
In the Mathematical Theory of Communications given by
Reference 14 , it was shown that a convenient measure of
information was the entropy. For a set of events with
probabilities p., p2 , ..., p , the entropy H is given by:





In a secrecy system there are two choices involved, that
of the message and that of the key. We may measure the
amount of information produced when a message is chosen
by
H(P) = - ZJp(P) log p(P)
the summation being over all possible messages. Similarly,
there is an uncertainty associated with the choice of key
given by
H(K) = - 2p(K) log p(K)
For perfect secrecy systems the amount of information
in the message is at most log n (occurring when all messages
are equiprobable) . This information can be concealed
completely only if the key uncertainty is at least log n.
In a more general way of expressing this: There is a
limit to what we can achieve with a given uncertainty in
key, the amount of uncertainty we can introduce into the
solution cannot be greater than the key uncertainty.
The situation gets more complicated if the number of
messages is infinite. For example, assume that messages
are generated as infinite sequences of letters by a suitable
Markoff process. From the definition, no finite key will
give perfect secrecy. We can suppose then, that the key
source generates keys in the same manner, that is as an
24

infinite sequence of symbols. Suppose further that only a
certain length Lk is needed to encipher and decipher a
length L of message. Let the logarithm of the number of
letters in the message alphabet be R and that for the key
alphabet be Rk . Then from the finite case, it is evident
that perfect secrecy requires
R L < R, L,
p p — k k
This type of perfect secrecy is obtained by the Vernam
system [Ref . 16]
.
Thus, it can be concluded that the key required for
perfect secrecy depends on the total number of possible
messages. The disadvantage of perfect systems for large
correspondence systems such as for data communications and
data retrieval services, is the equivalent amount of key
that must be sent.
In this paper the requirement for a large key for large
messages is eliminated by designing a self keyed system
that will continually originate key letters based on several
past letters that were already ciphered. Provided enough
distance is chosen in between selected letters the system
will avoid the statistical dependency of consecutive letters
in a natural language, thus generating a sequence of key




A cryptographic system can be compared with a communi-
cation system in the sense that whereas in one the signal
is unintentionally perturbed by noise, and in the other,
namely the cryptographic system, the message is inten-
tionally perturbed by the ciphering process to hide the
information. Thus, there is an uncertainty of what was
actually transmitted. From information theory a natural
mathematical measure of uncertainty is the conditional
entropy of the transmitted signal when the received signal
is known. This conditional entropy is known as equivocation,
HCX/Y) = -Ep(x,y) log p(x/y)
From the point of view of the cryptanalyst, a secrecy
system is almost identical with a noisy communication
system. The message is operated by a statistical element,
the enciphering system, with its statistically chosen key.
The result of this operation is the cryptogram, which when
transmitted is vulnerable to interception and available for
analysis. The main differences in the two cases are:
1. The operation of the enciphering transformation
is generally of a more complex nature than the perturbing
noise in a channel.
2. The key for a secrecy system is usually chosen
from a finite set of possibilities while the noise in the
26

channel is more often continually introduced, in effect
chosen from an infinite set.
With these considerations in mind it is natural to use
the equivocation as a theoretical secrecy index. It may
be noted that there are two significant equivocations,
that of the key and that of the message which are denoted
as H(K/C) and H(P/C)
:
H(K/C) = -Ep(C,K) log p(K/C)
H(P/C) = -Ip(C,P) log p(K/P)
The same general arguments used to justify the equivo-
cation as a measure of uncertainty in communication theory
apply here as well. Zero equivocation requires that one
message (or key) have unit probability and all others zero,
corresponding to complete knowledge.
E. IDEAL SECRECY SYSTEMS
In Reference 15, the concept of equivocation leads to
means of evaluating secrecy systems as a function of the
amount of N, the number of letters received. It is shown
that for most systems as N increases the referred equivo-
cations tend to decrease to zero, consequently the solution
of the cryptogram becomes unique at a point called unicity
point.
In the section on Perfect Secrecy it was stated that
perfect secrecy requires an infinite amount of key if
27

messages of unlimited length are allowed. With a finite
key size, the equivocation of key and message generally
approaches zero. The other extreme is for H(K/C) to be
equal to H(K). Then, no matter how much material is
intercepted, there is not a unique solution but many of
comparable probability. An ideal system can be defined as
one in which H(K/C) and H(P/C) do not approach zero as
N increases. A strongly ideal system would be one in which
H(K/C) remains constant at H(K), that is, knowing the crypto-
gram has not aided in solving the key uncertainty.
An example of an ideal cipher is a simple substitution
in an artificial language in which all letters are equi-
probable and successive letters independently chosen.
With natural languages it is in general possible to
approximate the ideal characteristic. The complexity of
the system needed usually goes up rapidly when an attempt
is made to realize this. To approximate the ideal equivo-
cation, one may first operate on the message with a trans-
ducer which removes all redundancies. After this almost
any simple ciphering system — substitution, transposition,
etc., is satisfactory. The more elaborate the transducer
and the nearer the output is to the desired form, the
more closely will the secrecy system approximate the ideal
characteristic
.
The work to be presented in following sections, will
describe a scheme to approximate the ideal secrecy system
by using a digital computer to mainly accomplish two things:
28

1. Change the probability structure of natural languages
to obtain an almost equiprobable occurrence of letters.
2. Eliminate the statistical dependence of successive
letters in natural languages.
Further, a message transformed to reflect these
properties, will be either transmitted as such or an addi-




The development of a digital substitution cipher was
the first step taken to accomplish the present work.
After it, more complex variations were experimented to
obtain a reasonable secure system taking advantage of the
use of the computer. Thus, it can be said that most of the
subsequent work rests on these first results. A brief
explanation follows of the Decwriter system and its character
codes used to interface with the PDP-11/40 computer.
A. THE DECWRITER SYSTEM
The LC11 Decwriter system is a high-speed teletype-
writer designed to interface with the PDP-11 family of
processors to provide both: Input (keyboard) and output
(printer) functions for the system. It can be used as the
console input/output device. The system can receive
characters from the keyboard or can print at speeds up to
30 characters per second in standard ASCII formats. The
character code used is USASCII-68 which is listed in Table
No. I. From these 128 characters, only 64 are printing
characters, those of columns 2, 3, 4 and 5. Table No. II




COLUMN 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
BOW
4321 765 C
— J L. ——
—
r
> loop \QQ] i'oio ynjT .jToo" ii01 iiif? 12u
0000 NUL DLE SP @ p \ p
1 0001 SOH DC1 r i A Q a q
2 0010 STX DC2 »> 2 B R b r
3 0011 ETX DC3 # 3 C S c s
4 0100 EOT DC4 s 4 D T d t
5 0101 ENQ NAK % 5 E U c u
6 0110 ACK SYN & 6 F V f V
7 0111 BEL ETB ' 7 G W g w
8 1000 BS CAN ( 8 H X h X
9 1001 HT EM
)
9 I Y i y
10 1010 LF SUB * J Z J z
U 1Q11 VT ESC + > K ( k {
12 1100 FF FS
,
< L \ 1 11
13 1101 CR GS — = M ] m }
14 1110 SO RS
.
> N s~\ n ~
15 1111 SI US / ? o DEL
TABLE I - USASCII-68 CHARACTER CODE
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SP 10100000 10110000 @ 11000000 p 11010000
T 10100001 1 10110001 A 11000001 Q 11010001
it 10100010 2 10110010 B 11000010 R 11010010
# 10100011 3 10110011 c 11000011 s 11010011
$ 10100100 4 10110100 D 11000100 T 11010100
% 10100101 5 10110101 E 11000101 u 11010101
& 10100110 6 10110110 F 110Q011Q V 11Q1Q110
f 10100111 7 10110111 G 11000111 w 11010111
( 10101000 8 10111000 H 11001000 X 11010000
). 10101001 9 10111001 I 11001001 Y 11011Q01
* 10101010 : 10111010 J 11001010 z 11011Q10
+ 10101011 / 10111011 K 11001011 c 11Q11Q11
t 10101100 < 10111100 L 11001100
1
110U100
- 10101101 = 10111101 M 11001101 ] HOlllOl
• 10101110 > 10111110 N 11001110 •\ 11011110
/ 10101111 •p 10111111 11001111 11011111




B. APPLICATION OF GROUP THEORY TO CRYPTOGRAPHY
A group is defined as a set of elements a, b, c, ...
and an operation, denoted by + for which the following
properties are satisfied:
a) For any elements a,b, in the set, a + b is in the
set.
b) The associative law is satisfied; that is, for
any a,b,c in the set
a + (b + c) = (a + b) + c
c) There is an identity element, I, in the set such
that
a+I=I+a=a; all a in the set.
d) For each element a, there is an inverse a in
the set satisfying
a + a =a + a = I
A group is abelian or commutative if
a + b = b + a for all a and b in the set,
The integers under ordinary addition and the set of
binary sequences of a fixed length n under exclusive-or
operation are examples of abelian groups.
33

From boolean algebra, an additional property of an
abelian group of binary sequences of a fixed length n
under the exclusive-or operation is that,
given a + b = c
then a + c = b
and b + c = a; for all a,b and c in
the group.
The 8-bit binary sequences with which the computer
handles the ASCII code characters is in this sense an
abelian group. This last property suggested the idea of
encrypting simply by exclusive-oring the desired set of
sequences by a key (another sequence or a set of sequences)
.
Decrypting or recovery of the original sequences can be
done simply by exclusive-oring the obtained set of sequences
with the key.
Basically the transformation can be expressed as
C = K + P , for encryption, and
P = K + C , for decryption,
where C, K and P represent an 8-bit sequence stored in a
register and the symbol + stands for the logical exclusive-
or operation.
o
While it is clear that the whole 2 8-bit sequences
can be used to represent crypto sequences, since this set
34

of sequences constitute an abelian group; a limitation was
imposed through this work to allow transformations to be
done between printing characters (those of Table II)
.
That is, restrict the domain and range of the transforma-
tions to the binary sequences of Table II.
We can further realize the 12 possible combinations
of two sequences of same or different sets by exclusive-
oring them and observe that the range of the transformations
is given by the sets of sequences whose 4-left most are:



















From Table II it can be observed that these sequences
no longer form a group under the exclusive-or operation,
since choosing any two sequences will originate a new
sequence not in the referred table. For example:
Plaintext character = A = 11000001 +
Key character = L = 11001100
Ciphered character = 00001101
And we obtained a sequence 00001101 not in the table.
If we observe sets A, B, C and D of Table II, we will
observe that each set has its 4-left most bits equal. Or
that the dom ain of the transformation is given by the
sequences whose 4-left most bits are:
Set A 10 10
Set B 10 11
Set C 110
Set D 110 1
In order to make the range of the transformations equal
to its domain in accordance with the restriction imposed,
an additional binary multiplier: The intermediate key (IK)




The value of IK is dependent on the particular transfor-
mation desired and the key to be used. For example:
A system is designed to transform characters from set B
into characters of set C for encryption. The decryption
is done by doing the inverse. Now assume that the key to
be used for a particular transformation belongs to set D.
Plaintext character = 8 = 10111000 (Set B)
Key character = Z = 11011010 (Set D)
01100010
IK = 10100000
Crypto character = B = 11000010 (Set C)
The intermediate key value was obtained by exclusive-
oring the 4-left most bits of the plaintext, the key and
the crypto characters, as shown below.
Plaintext character 1011 +
Key character 1101 +
Crypto character 1100
IK 10100000
For decrypting the inverse is done, that is:
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Crypto character = B = 11000010 (Set C)
Key character = Z = 11011010 (Set D)
00011000
IK = 10100000
Plaintext character = 8 = 10111000
Based on the concepts so far presented and the idea
of the intermediate key multiplier, that allows for sequences
of Table II to behave like a group, Table III was con-
structed. It gives the necessary values of IK for all
possible transformations in between sets. From this general
table, it can be obtained typical tables of required values
of IK for each specific transformation. For example, if












Then the required table of IK values will be:
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K E Y S E T
A B C D
PLAINTEXT SET
A C D A B
B C D A B
C C D A B
D C D A B
D. SIMPLE SUBSTITUTION
Although the scheme developed and presented until now
provides for transformations using the 64 printing charac-
ters, a restriction was placed to be able to handle only
the 26 letters of the English alphabet plus the additional
6 characters that appear in Table No. II, sets C and D.
Thus, for the simple substitution ciphers transformations












A B C D
PLAINTEXT SET
A B A D C
B B A D C
C B A D C
D B A D C
Figure 2 shows in block diagram the computer realization
of this simple substitution cipher. Appendix A gives the
complete program to accomplish this. Figure 3 is an
example of this cipher.
E. GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF RESULTS
Natural languages, such as English, Spanish, German,
French, etc., have a characteristic letter frequency. For
example, the normal frequency for English is as shown in
Table IV.
For the purpose of observing the statistical nature
of plaintexts as well as of cryptograms obtained, a computer
program (shown in Appendix B and C) was made to realize
the following computations:
- Count the number of occurrences of each letter in
a text.
- Calculate and plot the percentage of occurrence of
each character in the text.
- Calculate the mean value of percentage of occurrences.



















































a) Plaintext message (input)
WC_^DHUKK\H"DKSRD'PVRSKGE'-ZVE"C NHQXEHBDRHVDHVHCTEDCHNRVE
HPEV5BVCRHCR0CH~VH~VQXEZVC <"kXVHC_RXENKDB~eVUE RHGXEHUXCHR
V P " V R R E D H V V £ H Z V C _ R Z V C ~ T "' V V D H U H " C H " D H V D B Z R £ H C _ V C H C _ R H E R V
£ R E H _ V D H C> X Z R H B V £ R E D C V V £ "" V P H X Q H Q E R D - Z V V H T V C T 3 C B D H V V £ H R C R Z
R V C V E N H G E X U V U ~ C " C N H V V S H " V H C _ R H C V C R E H T _ V G C R E D H D X Z R H "" V C E X £
B T C X E N H E V V £ X Z H G E X T R D D H C _ R X E N H U H B V G X E C B V V C R C N HC _ R E R H " D H X V
RHZXERHERFB"ERZRVCHC-VCH"DH-VESREHCXHZRRCHWHC-RHERVSREHZ
B D C H _ V ft R H V HER V D X V V UCRHCRRRCH X G! H Z V C - R Z V C " T V C H Z V C B E " C N
b) Cryptogram message (output)
Figure 3. Example of a simple substitution
























































TABLE IV - FREQUENCY OF THE LETTERS OF THE ENGLISH




For each transformation done, the text was analyzed
by this program and the results were plotted. In the
horizontal axis are the 32 chosen characters in the
following order from zero to 31:
@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ [/] A
In the vertical axis the percentage of occurrence scale
or frequency distribution is plotted.
Examples of these plots are given by Figures 5 to 8.
There the frequency distribution of letters for the









The author has preferred to give the results achieved
through this work by presenting these plots rather than
giving messages and their cryptograms as examples of what
was obtained. Inherent with these plots is an evaluation
of the system used in each case. Additional information
that will be found in these plots is the standard deviation




For the simple substitution cipher, it was expected
to obtain similar results as for the plaintext of Figure 5.
Figures 8 to 10 show the frequency distribution of characters
when this system was used with different keys. As expected,
similar results were obtained but with the values changed
from one character to another. This occurred since one
character or letter has just been replaced by another
through these transformations. Table V presenting in
tabular form the number of occurrences for these substitu-
tions gives a figure of what has occurred with the messages
in each case.
In Section IV, Theory of Secrecy Systems, it was stated
that one goal to achieve ideal secrecy was to change the
probability structure of natural languages to obtain an
equiprobable occurrence of letters. This is the reason why
the calculation of standard deviation was considered to
evaluate secrecy obtained. Since the language to be used
in this present work will be English it may be useful to
keep in mind that the standard deviation for an English
text is 3.81 as stated in Figure 4.
F. PSEUDORANDOM SUBSTITUTION
The simple substitution cipher can also be called
monoalphabetic cipher since there is only one alphabet
to encipher the message. The cryptanalytic weakness of
this cipher is the fact that a given plain language letter



























































































































































































































































































































Character* 8 A C K N
@ 24 3 77 7
A 3 24 94 12 248
B 94 77 3 37 24
C 77 94 24 128 4
D 128 37 7 77 248
E 37 128 12 94
F 12 7 37 3 4
G 7 12 128 24 24
H 4 24 248 77 12
I 24 4 94 7
J 24 3 128
K 4 24 37
L 248 7 94
M CP 12 77
N 248 24 37 24
248 4 128 3
P 11 105 27 12 3 68
Q 105 11 27 32 3 93
R 27 27 1Q.5 160 76 33
S 37 27 11 33 63 48
T 33 160 12 27 93 3
U 160 33 32 27 68 3
V 32 12 160 105 48 63
W 12 32 33 11 33 76
X 63 76 3 93 27 32
Y 76 63 3 68 27 12
z 3 3 76 48 105 33
[ 3 3 63 33 11 160
/ 33 48 93 3 12 27
] 48 33 68 3 32 27
68 93 48 76 160 11
93 68 33 63 33 105
Table No. V .- Simple substitution cipher





In this section, a digital polyalphabetic substitution
very much alike to the Vigenere square, cited by Sinkov
[Ref. 17], is designed. The originality of the scheme
presented here is the fact that the different alphabets
are used in a pseudorandom way and that this is generated
through a simple algorithm in the computer.
The basis for the program to realize this cipher is
provided by the same algorithm as for the simple substitution
case, the only variation being that the key will change for
each character to be ciphered. These changes of key are
controlled by a program and thus the inverse transformation
can be made to decipher by using the same program. This
fact that we are using a different key each time is the
same as using a new substitution alphabet for each character.
It must be set clear here that the key used was a single
letter and not a number of letters equal to the message
length. This single letter was used to initialize a register
used as a counter. For each new letter of the message
the register contents were increased by one each time until
a specific number was reached, in which case the register
was reset to zero. This specific number is the desired
number of alphabets to be used. Figure 11 gives a graphical
idea of how this was accomplished. In the figure, N
represents the total number of alphabets to be used; it
ranges from one, for a simple substitution, to 32 when using




























Figure 11. Psuedorandom cipher block diagram
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The result expected for this cipher was the origination
of an artificial language with 32 possible characters and
with a letter frequency different than that of the plaintext
message in natural English language.
To observe the results of this cipher two sets of
transformations were made:
1. Using 15 alphabets and six different keys.







2. Using a single key and different number of
alphabets, in the following order:
a) 7 alphabets; key R
b) 15 alphabets; key R
c) 23 alphabets; key R
d) 31 alphabets; key R
Figures 12 and 13 show some results obtained for the
first set of transformations as a plot of percentage of
occurrence of the 32 different characters. As can be
observed, for the six cases, all the characters have a
certain number of occurrences in the cryptogram obtained,
thus giving rise to an artificial language of 32 characters




In the same way, Figures 14 and 15 show some results
obtained for the second set of transformations , which are
essentially the same as the first set.
A measure of how different these results are from the
plaintext is provided by the standard deviations in each
case and are here listed to provide a means of evaluating
the results achieved:











These standard deviation values compared with the 3.81 for
the plaintext, represent a significant flattening of the
percentage of occurrence plots, or in other words, the
cryptogram has a more equiprobable letter frequency.
A significant property of this scheme if we envision it
as part of a digital communication system, is the fact that
it offers no error propagation during the message processing
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The reason for this is the fact that each character is
operated upon independently from all others. Thus, if
there is an error in the bit representation of a letter,
there will be an error in its transformation to crypto
character or in the decryption of it and no error will
occur in other characters due to it.
In the next section, a cryptographic scheme will be
presented that although contributing to the communication
system degradation, gives better results in the sense that
a nearly equiprobable artificial language is achieved
which represents a significant achievement for security of
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VI. THE DATA-KEYED CIPHER
A. INTRODUCTION
In this section the data-keyed cipher is presented.
First, a very general description of the system is given.
Then the transfer function concept of the cipher and the
reversibility and consistency of its is explained, together
with the equated logical form of the transformation which
the author appreciates as being a very meaningful representa-
tion of the cipher in logical form. After that the computer
realization is presented in block diagram form. The test
procedure for valuating secrecy accomplished and significant
results are then given. Finally, the communication system
degradation due to it is analyzed.
B. DESCRIPTION AND REALIZATION
Section IV explains how the PDP-11/40 computer is
handled to realize the simple substitution cipher, con-
sistency was shown with some examples and further, the
known cryptoanalytic weakness of it was explained and
graphically represented by Fig. 4 where it can be observed
the frequency distribution of the plaintext and of some
cryptograms and their similarity can be established.
The data-keyed cipher can be explained in a general
form as the scrambling of the bits of a character by
operating on them by past characters, either of the plain-
text, when ciphering, or of the cryptogram, when deciphering,
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Provided these past characters are far enough apart in
the sequence their operation on the character to be trans-
formed will result in a nearly random transformation.
This idea was supported by the fact that for far enough
distance between two letters in a written language there
is nearly no statistical dependence between them.
Figure 16 provides the conceptual idea of this cipher.
At this point, two significant characteristics that
distinguish this cipher are to be emphasized:
1. From Figure 16(a) and (b) it can be seen that both
diagrams can be conceived as a transfer function that
essentially perform similar transformations on their inputs
An advantage is that when this is realized in the computer
by a program, the same program will execute both trans-
formations; that of ciphering and deciphering.
2. From Figure 16(b) it can be observed that there is
no feedback present, that is, the outputs are not dependent
on past outputs. The significance of this fact will be
considered at the end of this section when system degrada-
tion for this cipher is treated.
The realization of this ciphering scheme again uses the
basic transformations presented in Section IV, plus addi-
tional steps are included to accomplish the data-keyed
function. The conceptual idea given in Figure 16 can now


























Figure 16. Data-Keyed Cipher-Concept
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CIPHERING: Cj=(K + C.^) + P.
DECIPHERING: P. = (K + C. ,) + C.
where
P^ = present plaintext character
C. = present crypto character
C._
1
= "i" times preceding crypto character
K = key character
Again the operator used is the Exclusive-Or. These
logical equations show the reversibility of the trans-
formation and thus its consistency.
Figure 17 is now presented to give a more significant
representation of the transformation to be realized. The
index "i" is selective and it represents the distance
between characters already explained.
Figure 18 shows the block diagram of the realization
of this cipher in the PDP-11/40.
Appendix D gives the complete listing of the program
used.
C. TEST PROCEDURE
The plaintext message used to test the results of this





















») Deciphering: P. = (K + C. i ) + C.



























K= (K + C. .)
Figure 18. Data-Keyed Cipher-Block Diagram
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statistics representative of the English language as shown
in Figure 4
.
This cipher, as depicted by Figure 17, has two possible
choices of variables, namely:
- The key, with a total of 32.
- The delay factor "i" which could be varied from
zero, for a simple substitution; up to any number n.
However, for any choice of n there will be the same amount
of simple substitution characters at the beginning of the
cryptogram. This disadvantage can be avoided by using for
the first letters of the plaintext, meaningless text.
As for the simple substitution case, the intermediate
keys were selected to reflect the transformations between
sets C and D of Table II.
To observe the results obtained with this cipher two
sets of transformations were made:
1. Using a fixed value of "i" and six different keys.









2. For a fixed key and the following values of "i"
(Key = J)
:
a) i = 2
b) i = 3
c) i = 10
d) i = 13
e) i = 17
f) i = 20
D. RESULTS
The results obtained for this cipher were, in all
cases, significantly better than the Pseudorandom cipher
of the previous section in the sense that the standard
deviations were much lower, thus obtaining a nearly
equiprobable text of cryptograms.
For the test procedure established, the following were
the specific results obtained:
1. For a fixed value of "i" and using 6 out of 32
possible keys the following were the values of standard
deviation obtained:









Figures 22 and 23 are some example plots for
these cases. These figures are shown at the end of this
section.
2. For a fixed key, different values of "i" were
tried. The values of standard deviation obtained in each
case were:







Figures 24 and 25 are some example plots for
these cases. and are presented at the end of this section.
We can now compare these results with the statistics of
a plaintext English message with a standard deviation of
3.81 (see Figure 4). A significant flattening of the
percentage of occurrence plots has occurred. In addition
the statistical dependence of occurrence of the letter in
the message has been hidden. The reason for this will be
explained in the last part of this section where the nature
of the ciphering scheme is explained in detail, together




In Section IV it was stated, from Shannon [Ref. 15],
that an ideal cipher may be an artificial language in which
all letters are equiprobable and successive letters
occurring independently. This is nearly the case for this
cipher. Now a simple substitution, such as the one
presented in Section V, can be performed on the message
without making it easier to decipher.
3. A very meaningful characteristic of this scheme
was the fact that the same program recovers or deciphers
the message. Figures 19 and 20 present two examples of the
encrypting results after being processed by the program
corresponding to this cipher.
To give an idea of the number of occurrences of
each character in the cryptograms for each of the 12 cases
of (1) and (2) , Tables VI and VII are next presented.
4. The implementation of this cipher in a digital
computer can also be seen as the implementation of a code
where the transformations are dependent on a key (a letter
or character) , the present letter to be encoded and some
past crypto character.
v
E. COMMUNICATION SYSTEM DEGRADATION
Due to the nature of the process of ciphering and
deciphering of this system, it can be said that when it
comes to play an integral part of a communication system,
it, at the most, will double the probability of block error,











a) Plaintext message (input)
C G C Z @ L Q S \ - G P @ § V Z L U S ] V U J I M _ ] _ G ] U C R Z B N K K E U M X RBV6P-LHFN C Q R
N
& \ G S T G P I V @@ZQ@LSCLZ U Z \ M 3 V K P C M @ J V - W R R K @ L \ H U
P
"
3L V P 1 1 R J U E V
7 ] E _ S Q D F H _ V X @ _ V R 5 V X Z G U V C Q T H F T I \ L M " H J V I L J 5 X _ F R R " M T P M C X _
XVELVBHCHUC ZJGUT"DKMXZR~SPGQ 3FW0U£\__C K-W-MPMKCURC EVR ] 1
5-LWGHRNBS 3UVRTEIRMC UB"XEF\ ]I 3\0SG@ 3R_OHUF9RBSQ~I\ 3FCV
HVKQGICGZT\3VEeFVTZniI6 3PXKGEZKK3 3HFBLVVJ[XLNK3_K3PVN6QR
1 R Z Z Q M C C C L P N M S U V D § G U U D I S D L \ M D S _ M H K P K Z U V J D X LLSSEKRZCZ @ C
MBMGQRJ 3RPRFMPJQ\RPVGLUHIT_E3VIVC CTSSC NSC QE 3VIEJC LE
b) Cryptogram message (output)
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a) Plaintext message (input)
D § S 3 G K V C [ _ G P & § v Z L R T Z Q P M N J _ 3 _ G 3 U C fi 3 V I L L B R J X fi B V G P _ L R I D V U I
GSGSTGPIVGG ]HGKT\LZHZ\M 3VLM\P6MGXWflfiKC-L\HRWVZK"WN I QR JWEV
T Z S X C V C R _ V X @ _ V RS"_3§RQ \ V T H F T I \ L M V M Q N K M T X _ F R R " M H S M J D _ X
_
VELV-HCHRS3M@RSVDKMXZR"SW§VZfiPHR§\„ C K-MXC NWJLDRRC EVR3 3
SXKP&GFIES 3UVR"TENFP\REV_EFS3I 3\OT©GZUXHOUF§RBSQ~NC ZRDXG
OVKQGICGZSC Z.rBGRQTZMI IG 3P-L&B 3LLZ JWFBLVVJ\-KILZXL 3DVH6QR
3 F 3 3 H V J [: \ C L P N H S U V C G . R R C N C D L \ N D S _ M L U L 3 R ' M D X L L Q S E K U 3 \ 3 6 H \
J B M G Q R J 3 fi W F ft P M M V E R P V L U M I 5 X B Z ~ N " \ C T S S C N S E V \ H Z " N B M C L E
b) Cryptogram message (output)



































KEY ( i = 7 )
@ A C G K N
36 33 40 46 45 32
35 38 37 40 40 34
35 40 33 32 32 42
55 50 51 52 53 50
47 42 56 50 42 48
46 51 52 49 46 59
47 55 41 42 44 47
50 42 41 40 46 36
41 35 48 35 43 41
38 44 44 38 41 52
34 41 28 31 29 33
47 40 40 44 38 34
44 37 34 47 48 37
42 49 39 45 45 47
29 29 32 29 29 33
32 32 42 38 37 33
51 37 47 38 36 45
43 57 48 44 48 51
50 55 45 43 61 58
58 53 62 6Q 61 50
53 39- 42 51 49 46
40 54 43 47 50 41
51 51- 48 50 52 63
38 38 49 51 50 53
59 62 45 54 56 47
64 61 53 56 53 49-
43 37 54 40 38 50
37 43 51 51 52 36
52 40 46 37 39 43
51 63 58 55 51 60
52 52 46 60 42 58
52 52 57 57 56 44
Table No. VI . - Data-keyed cipher






it • H VALUES ( KEY = J )
Character 2 3 10 13 17 20
@ 37 42 40 32 42 46
A 41 40 36 35 41 48
B 48 39 49 34 36 40
C 44 37 38 40 29 39
D 34 43 47 41 41 50
E 43 41 46 49 50 47
F 47 43 35 47 42 48
G 45 46 48 39 40 33
H 48 39 44 33 48 38
I 38 36 34 53 45 35
J 32 54 36 46 42 38
K 52 42 40 38 41 31
L 41 42 37 38 40 38
M 37 41 34 44 36 36
N 45 28 52 48 35 42
26 45 42 41 50 49
P 44 46 49 59 51 50
Q 36 52 58 50 48 45
R 61 36 46 53 47 45
S 46 65 37 56 48 62
T 60 62 43 43 52 48
U 49 50 47 54 56 50
V 54 44 45 55 40 55
W 46 50 62 38 50 49
X 43 58 53 36 46 44
Y 49 42 51 49 49 52
Z 44 45 41 49 57 54
[ 44 57 53 55 49 36
/ 60 50 48 40 39 45
] 54 42 62 46 55 55
•\ 52 50 55 55 53 56
52 45 44 56 54 48
Table No. VII.- Data-keyed cipher





byte. It must be emphasized that, although for ease of
computer realization the 8-bit byte was used to represent
a letter; only 5 bits could have been enough since we are
using only 32 letters or characters.
This increase in probability of error can be said to
be significant but with the availability of error correcting
codes the initial probability of error can be reduced as
desired and appropriately so that doubling it when using
the cryptosystem will not be that significant. Further,
since a computer is being used to implement it, it also
can be used to realize a suitable error correcting scheme.
In the next section, a suitable error correcting scheme is
presented, that will essentially overcome this degradation.
The examples that follow are intended to explain how
the probability of block error is doubled and also the
existence of a transient simple substitution for the first
"i" characters.
Based on these two examples the following observations
can be made:
1. There is a transient simple substitution for the
first "i" characters when enciphering. This is the case
of C, , C2 and C 3 from Example 1.
2. After the transient simple substitution, the crypto
characters are a result of a number of plaintext characters.
And, the higher the index of the crypto to be obtained, the
more the number of plaintext characters on which it depends.
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Example No. 1 Enciphering process
Transformation: C. = (K+C. .) +P.
Plaintext sequence: P1 /P 2 ' P 3' P 4' P 5' P 6' P 7' P 8 /P 9
Let i = 3
C
x












= K + (:.,_ + P 4






















C 6 " K + C 3 + P 6


















) + P ?
Cg = K + C
5
































= K + C
9
+ P12 = P 3 +
P
6















Example No. 2 Deciphering process
Transformation: P. = (K + C •) + C












Let i = 3, as before
P, = K + C,
P
2
= K + C
2
P 3
= K + C3
P 4























= K + Cg + C
5




3. The order of dependency observed in Example 1 is
different for the deciphering case, where the recovering
of the text is just dependent on two crypto characters.
Thus, one error in the crypto sequence will just give rise
to two errors in the plaintext.
Figure 21 gives an example of the transient simple
substitution explained. The value of "i" chosen there
is 50. As an example it can be observed here that for
the first 50 characters of the plaintext the letter R is


























Figure 21. Data-keyed Cipher - Example of



































































































































































VII. ERROR CORRECTING SCHEME
The data-keyed cipher of the last section offers to
the system a degradation in the sense that the probability
of word error is doubled due to the nature of the encipher-
ment process, as was explained. This increase in error
will undoubtedly affect the legibility of any message.
Thus it was necessary to look into error correcting codes
that will eventually overcome this present disadvantage.
Again the availability of the digital computer proved to
be very useful for enciphering the message and to encode
it for transmission.
The error correcting code developed was intended for
transmission over a memoryless binary symmetric channel.
A memoryless channel is the one on which noise does not
depend upon previous events . A binary symmetric channel
is one for which the probability of a zero to be changed
to a one, is equal to the probability of a one to be
changed to a zero, during transmission.
Notation that will encountered through this section
follows:
k = Number of information digits
m = Number of check bits
n = Code word length (n = k + m)
e = Maximum number of correctible bit errors
in one word
R = Data rate (R = k/n)
87

$ = Binary symmetric channel parameter
p(l/0) = p(0/l)
d = Hamming distance between code words.
A. BEST CODE DETERMINATION
The noise channel theorem as stated by Shannon [Ref. 14]
is:
Let a discrete channel have the capacity C
bits/sec. and a discrete source has the
entropy per second H. If H < C there
exists a coding scheme such that the output
of the source can be transmitted over the
channel with an arbitrarily small frequency
of errors. If H > C , it is possible to
encode the source so that the equivocation
is less than H - C + e , where e is
arbitrarily small. There is no method of
encoding that gives an equivocation less
than H - C .
The discrete source entropy for long messages consistin
of discrete symbols is given by
n
H(x) = - I p- log p.
i=l
where p. is the probability of occurrence of a given symbol
In the situation where the symbols are transmitted over a
noisy channel a given symbol x.^ may be received as y^.
Shannon's measure of uncertainty at the receiver of what
was actually transmitted is defined as:




For the binary symmetric channel this uncertainty is given
by:
H(x/y) = - (3 log 3 + (1-3) log (1-3))
Then the channel capacity is given by
C = H(x) - H(x/y) maximized for H(x)
.
A significant parameter commonly used is the probability
of word error in the message instead of the uncertainty
measure. The probability of word error is defined as:
_ . . Number of wrong decoded words
Number of words in message
It must be noted at this point that there will not
necessarily be a code word for each ASCII character used.
In fact this was the case for the code implemented, where
each 4 bits of the message sequence is encoded into a
15-bit word. Thus, each 8-bit ASCII character was encoded
into two words for transmission.
A "best code" means one that has least probability of
error for any give channel 3 and the highest rate given by
the ratio of information bits over the bit-length of each
code word. The error correction ability of the code can













which is a sufficient but not necessary condition. And







which is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
designing an e-tuple error correcting code.
Conversely, using these conditions, once a code is
chosen and specified by its rate (R) and code word length
(n) , the number of correctible e-tuples can be determined.
The theoretical value of probability of error is given
by Ash [Ref . 18]
:
e
p(e) = i = s n. a 1 (i- er 1
i=0 1
where N. is the number of correctible e-tuple errors, and
e- = 0,1,2,,.., up to the maximum number of correctible
errors per word.
The Hamming distance (d) is the minimum distance between
code words. If d happens to be even and the maximum value
of e is given by (d-l)/2 , this will yield a fraction.
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Then the number of maximum e-tuple errors is given by
Shiva [Ref. 19]
Number of correctible d/2 errors






(§) ! (§) !
For the same channel (3 constant) , reducing the probability
of error results in a reduction of the code rate. Working
backwards , for any given probability of error and word
length, one can estimate the information length and code
rate by using the Varsharmov-Gilbert-Sacks condition.
In the present work a cyclic code with a rate R = 4/15
is implemented to overcome the degradation due to the noisy
channel. Its effectiveness was tested by simulating trans-
mission over a binary symmetric channel with different
values of 3.
B. THE (15,4) CYCLIC CODE AND ITS COMPUTER REALIZATION
The theory of Cyclic Codes and their representation by
means of a k-stage feedback shift register is very well
treated by Ash [Ref. 18].
1. Selection of Polynomial
In order to be compatible with the 16-bit organiza-
tion of the PDP-11/40, the characteristic polynomial for
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this code was chosen from Appendix C of Peterson [Ref. 20],
and it was
4
G(x) - x + x + 1
which is an irreducible polynomial and which can be
represented by a 4-stage shift register as shown in Figure
26. Since G(x) is a maximum period irreducible polynomial,
4
with a period 2 - 1 = 15 , it divides the polynomial
15
x +1 (modulo 2). Thus, the check polynomial for this
code will be
H (x) =
x g^ 1 = x11 + x 8 + x7 + x5 + x 3 + x2 + x + 1
The polynomial chosen originates a (15,4) cyclic code,




The coefficients of the check polynomial for the code
word 00010011010111. Since the code is cyclic, any cyclic
shift of the check word and any linear combination of code
words is another code word. This property of the cyclic
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2. Computer Realization of Encoder
Encoding in a digital computer is accomplished by
realizing the shift-register operations by implementing a
matrix multiplication of the message word by a generator
matrix.
The generator matrix for the characteristic poly-
4









the code word [w] , , c .l , Id
A further comment can be made on the structure of
the generator matrix: The four rows are code words and
they are linearly independent, and, any of the other code
words can be obtained by linear combination of these four
rows. For ease of computer implementation, to obtain a code
word it was only needed to exclusive-or the rows of
[G] , , _ where a 1 occurs in the message word. Forl,lb
example,
[X] , . = 1 1 (message word)
First row of G =100010011010111 +




Appendix E shows the complete listing of this
encoding program.
3. Minimum Distance Decoder
Table VIII gives the code words for the 16 possible
message words when the (15,4) cyclic code is used. It can
be observed that the Hamming distance between these code
words is 8. That is, the number of different digits between
code words is 8 (d = 8)
.
With the minimum distance decoder, if any combination
of —R— or less errors occur in a received code word, it
can be corrected with absolute certainty. For this code, any
3 or less errors can be corrected successfully.
For the case when 4-digit errors occur (e = 4) , the
Varsharmov-Gilbert-Sacks condition (Upper bound)
- £(?
is not satisfied and thus there exists an uncertainty on
whether a 4-digit error will be corrected. It has been
found experimentally that 67.8% of different combinations
of 4-digit errors can be corrected. Appendix G shows the
complete listing of the decoding program.
C. NOISY CHANNEL SIMULATION
Table IX provides the expected probabilities of error
for transmission over a noisy binary symmetric channel when





















TABLE VIII. Message words and their correspondent





Probability of error P(e)
0.07050 5.4480 x 10" 3
0.09797 2.9176 x 10" 2
0.12426 6.2425 x 10" 2
0.13992 1.2542 x 10" 1
0.1709 1.8780 x 10" 1
0.26613 4.9052 x 10" 1
TABLE IX. P(e) vs. channel for the code (15,4)
Cetinyilmaz [Ref . 21] . In the same reference a noise
generating program is presented to simulate different
conditional probabilities of error for the BSC. The same
program was used in this thesis to simulate a noise BSC
and to test the effectiveness of the code implemented.
Appendix F gives a listing of the program.
Having the enciphering scheme, the error correcting
code and a mean for introducing noise into the message to
reflect different values of 3 for the channel, all were
combined to simulate a Secure Digital Communication System,
as depicted by Figure 27.

































a) Input program (address 20000 to 20036) - The message
is typed in. The program stores the message in ASCII code
form into memory locations 30002-32000 (16-bit form)
.
b) Data-keyed cipher program (10000-11044) - The key
to be used is typed in, the program stores it at 30000.
The program takes the message from 30000-32000, ciphers it
and then stores it at 40000-42000 (16-bit form) . The
parameter "i" can be selected at address 10014.
c) Input interface program (14000-14036) - This program
puts the ciphered text, already in 16-bit form, into 8-bit
form to be handled by the encoding program. 8-bit charac-
ters are moved into memory locations 51000-52000.
d) Encoder program (14040-14152) - Encodes message and
stores coded words into memory locations 52000-54000.






e) Noise generating program (14540-14754)
f) Noise mixing program (14756-15050) - Takes coded
words from 52000-54000 and exclusive-ors them with noise
words at 32000-34000, thus introducing noise into the text,
Results are stored back at 52000-54000.
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g) Minimum distance decoder (14154-14436) - Takes the
distorted coded words from location 52000-54000, decodes
them if they are correctible and stores the decoded words
at location 56000-57000. Check polynomial is 11536 at
address 50104.
h) Output interface program (14440-14464) - Takes decoded
words and moves them to 30000-32000 to be deciphered.
i) Data-keyed deciphering program (10000-11044) - Same
as (b) , the only change needed is to change the contents of
address 10012 from 40002 to 30002 to be compatible with the
decipherment process. The program deciphers the message
and stores the results in memory locations 40000-42000.
j) Output program (12000-12244) - Prints the cryptogram
and the plaintext message.
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VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
After looking at the computer organization and
establishing a basis to realize reversible transformations,




The first, provided the basis for the other two. It
was not intended to provide any significant amount of
security since the cryptanalytic weakness of a simple
substitution is well known.
The pseudo-random cipher is provided with a means to
do polyalphabetic substitutions. This kind of cipher is
known to be time consuming when done manually. The algorithm
used to generate pseudo-random keys was a simple one,
though it can be as complex as the user desires
.
With the data-keyed cipher very significant results
were obtained in the sense that its distribution plots
were fairly flat. A disadvantage presented by this cipher
was the error propagation when deciphering. This fact
motivated the author to look into error correcting codes
to use them with this or any other system. A (15,4) cyclic
error correcting block code was implemented. This code
contributed appreciably to reduce the probability of error,
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P(e), when transmission was simulated over a noisy binary
symmetric channel.
Finally, it can be said that the digital computer is
suitable for encrypting and coding data for transmission,
providing at the same time many different alternatives for
both functions. With the advent of microprocessors and
with communication systems tending to become all digital,
it is certain that we will see in the future a computer
performing these functions together with many more.
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R P P E N D I K ft . - PRO G R ft M F R THE
SIMPLE SUBSTITUTION CIPHER


















i 9 8 2 6
8 1 S 4













18 8 7 8






pi -1 pj 4 "< £
818119
8 18112






/ 5 8 8 2
.-' 8 8 5 8 2 7
/ 17 7 5 6 8





/ 5 8 2
,-' O 2 8 2 7
/ O 2 6
/ 1 8 O 2
/812782
/ 8 8 1
/ 8 8 416
,-' 8 2 8 8 2 7
/ 8 8 8 2 8 8
,-• 1 O O O 2
,••"012702
/ 8 8 8 8 8 2
/ 8 9 418
/ 2 9 8 2 7
/ 9 9 2 2
/ 1 8 9 8 2
/ 8 1 2 7 8 2
/ 8 8 8 9 8 5
/ O O 8 4 9 2
/ 8 1 2 7 8 2
/ 7
/ O 5 2 8 2
/ 1 8 5 7 2 7
/ 1 7 7 5 £ 4
/ 1 8 8 2 7 5
.-' 118 8 2 7
/ 1 7 7 5 6 5
,-' 9 9 5 9 8
1
,-'995927














































818 2 4 2
918 2 4 4
818246
18 2 5 9
/180275
/012701
/ 1 ? ? 5 6 2
/122791








/ 1 2 7 2
/ 1 2
/ 1 9 5 7 2 7
/ 17 7 5 6 4
/ 10 2 7 5
/ 112 7 2 7
,
••' 2 O
/ 1 7 7 5 6 6
/ 7 7 2 7
/105727
/ 1 7 7 5 6 4
/100275
/112727
/ 9 2 1
2
/ 1 7 7 5 6 6
/105727
/ 1 7 7 5 6 4
/ 1 O 2 7 5
/112727
/ O O 2 1




/ 9 9 9 9 9 4
/ 19 9 4 5 5
/ 9 2 2 7 9 2
.- 9 9 9 9 2
/ 10 4 2 5
/020127
,••' O 9 9 2 6 O
,••' 1 9 9 9 9 2
,••' 912 7 9 4
/ 9 9 9 2 6 9
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SIMPLE SUBSTITUTION PROGRAM. CONTINUATION
0102 5 4
01025 6




























19 2 5 9
819252
019254






10 2 7 2
1 2 7 4
818276
8 19 4 9 9
9 1 9 4 9 2
9 1 8 4 9 4
,•'999529
/ 2 912 7
/ 9 9 9 2 8 O
/ 1 9 O O 2
/912794
/ 9 9 9 2 6
/ 9 512
/ O 2 1 2 7
/ O0922O
/199992
,•' 912 7 9 4
/ 9 9 9 2 6
/ 9 9 9 5 4
/ 9 1 2 7 4
/ 0O026O
/ 9 9 9 5 9 i
/929127
/ 9 9 9 2 6 9
/199992
/ 912 7 9 4
/ 9 9 9 2 4 O
/ 8 9 9 4 7 2
/ 9 2 912 7
,'999299
/109992
/ 912 7 4
/ O O 2 4 O
/ O 9 9 4 5 5
/929127
/O8022O
/ 1 9 9 9 9 2
/ 912 7 9 4
/ 9 9 9 2 4 9
,-' 9 9 9 4 5 7
/ 012 7 9 4
/ 008240
,-' 9 9 9 4 5 4
Z922792
/ 9 9 9 9 9 6
,-• 19 9 4 2 5
/029127
/ 9 9 9 2 6 9
,-•' 1 9 9 9 9 2






























818 4 6 6
8184 7 8
818472












018 5 2 8
818522
818524




818 5 2 6
,-•000 44 2
/ 2 012 7
/ 2 8
/ 1 8 8 2
/012704
/ 8 O 2 2
/ 8 8 4 2 5
/820127
Z008228
,-' 1 8 O 2
,-' 012 7 4
,•'8 8 8 228
,-' 8 4 2 7
,-' 012 7 4
/ 8 8 2 2 8
/ 4 2 4
/ 2 1 2 7
,••' 8 2 6
/ 1 2
,-' 012 7 4




,-' 1 8 8 8 8 2





,-' 8 8 8 2 2 8
,-' 1 2






/ 8 7 4 4 01
/185727
,-' 1 7 7 5 6 4
/ 10 2 7 5
,-' 11012 7
/ 1 7 7 5 6 6
/ 5 2 8 2
/ 8 2 8 2 2 7
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9 195 7 6
9 1 9 6 9 9
9 1 9 6 9 2
9 196 9 4








1 9 6 2 4
9 1 8 6 2 5




9 18 6 4 8
919 6 4 2
7 9 9 8 8 5 8
7981926
7865662
7 19 5 7 2 7




7 17 7 5 6 6
7812782
7 9 9 9 8 1
2
718 5 7 2 7
7 17 7 5 6 4
7 18 8 2 7 5
7 1 1 2 7 2 7
7 8 8 9 2 9 9
,-' 17 7 5 6 6
/ 8 7 7 2 8 7
7185727
/ 17 7 5 6 4
7188275
7112 7 2 7
7 8 8 8 212
7 17 7 5 6 6
7185727
717 7 5 6 4
7199275
7112 7 2 7
7 9 9 9 212
7 17 7 5 6 6
7 8 8 5 8 8 2
7 8 8 5 8 8 4
7 8 8 816 7
717 7 2 4 4
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APPENDIX B, - PROGRRM TO COUNT THE NUMBER
OF OCCURRENCES OF EACH CHARACTER IN ft MESSAGE
STORED AT LOCATION 49090 FIND- UP
013000
012O02





















1 2 5 6





/ 1 1 7 ? O O
/ 1 2 7 O 2
,''00024 O
/ O O 5 2
/0127O1
/ 4
/ 2 1 1 2 7






/ 9 7 71
t
3 O 2 4 9
/ 9 2 4
/ O240
/ 10 5 7 2 7
,-' 17 7 5 6 4
,-' 1 2 7 5
/ 110 2 2 7
,-177566
/ 1 2 2 4
/ 0O5202
/ O 2 O 2 2 7































































ET B2, 6, ' C-ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPG'RSTUVWXVZC / 3~_'





N U M 8 E R F C C U R R E N C E S =
NO. OF OCCURRENCES
100. , 4, 254
I B S E T











LET R 1 , B 1 , I 2
STACK 281,200,
LET 81, 12, R4
TRANS 6 , 8 2 , I 2 , 1
1
HOLOUT ' KB' , U, ' :
'
LET R2, Bl, 12




S P E C ' C R
'
D I S P L V 81,' M ' , ' G
'
S P E C ' K 8
LET R 1 • 2 2
.
MOVE 81, 8 2
MUL Bl, Bl
INTG 82
LET R2, B2, 21
QUOT R2, R2, Rl
PRINT 'EXPECTED VALUE = ' , R;
PROD R2, R2, R2
INTG Bl
LET R2, 81, 21
DUCT R2, R2, Rl
D I F R 2 , R 2 , R 2
PRINT ' V A R I A N C E = ' , R 2
STACK 2 2, 16, 255
PRINT ' S T A N D A R D D E V I A T I N =


















9 1 9 9 3 O
91002 2
9 1 9 9 2 4





9 199 5 9
9 19 5 2
9 1 O 5 4
9 1 O 5 6
9 10O6
910 06 2
9 1 O 6 4
9 100 6 6






















/ O 5 O
/ 5 O O 2
/ O O 5 3?
/ 1 ? 7 5 6 O
/ 1 5 ? 2 7
/ 1 7 7 5 6 O
/ 10 2 7 5
/O12700
/177562



















/ O 4 2
/O12702
/ 8 8 O 7
,- 5 2 2






















































/ 1 2 7
/ 4
/01272?










/i 7 7 56
/ 1 2 7 5
/012701
/ 1 7 7 5 6 2
/ 1 2 7 8 4
/0 81 002
/010124
/ 1 4 2 7
,-' 1 8 2
.-' 5 4
/ 2 2 7 01
,-' 8 215
/ 010 4 2




/ 17 7 5 6 4
/1 00275
/ 11012 7
/ 1 7 7 5 6 6




/ 1 2 7 5











































10 2 7 6
010272








/ 1 7 7 5 6 4
,-'100275






/ 112 7 2 7
/ 212
,-177566
/ 1 2 7
/ 0117 2










,-' 012 7 4
/ 2 6
/ 5 2
,-' 2 012 7
/ 2
..•• 1 9 e e 2
/012704
,-' O 2 6
,-•000 512
,-•020127
,-' 9 2 2
/ 1 2
,-' 012 7 6 4
,--' 2 6
/ 5 4
,-• 012 7 4
,-' 00 2 6
/ 5 01











































616 5 2 4
61652 6
616 5 3 6
616 5 3 2
01653 4
616 5 3 6
,-' 6 6 6 2 6 6
,••"166663
,-' 612 7 6 4
,•'000240
/ 6 6 6 4 7 3
,-'62812 7
/ 6 66 3 66






/ 1 6 6 6 3
/012704
/ 2 4
,-' 6 4 5 7
,-' 012 7 6 4
,-' 6 2 4
,-' 4 5 4
,-'622783
/ 6
/ 10 4 2 5
,-' 2 012 7
/ 2 6
/ 1 3
.-• 012 7 4
/ 3 2






,••• 012 7 4
,••'0 03 20
/ 000435
,-' 2 012 7
/ 6 3 2
,-' 10 3
,-' 012 7 4
,-'000326
,-' 4 2 7
,-' 012 7 4
,-' 3 2
,-'000424
































1 6 3 O
010622












1 6 6 4
O10666
O1O670
























/ 2 2 7 2 7
/ 01012
/ 2 7 7 7 O
<' 10002 4
/ 1 2 7 04
/ 1 6
/ 1 2 4 2 7
,-'001014
,-010427
,-' O 1 O 6




/ O 7 7 4 2
/ 0O0241





/ 7 7 4 O 2
,-' 012 70 4
/ 01014









































































.•' 4 I -.' •? -' •?
i JL X i. i _• i
.
-' 215
/ 17 7 5 6 6
/ 012 7 2
/ 9 012
/105727
,-' 17 7 5 6 4











,-' 17 7 5 6 6
,-'105727















































RPPENDIX E. - ENCODING PROGRAM FOR
THE < 15,4 ) CVCLIC CODE
014948 ,'912789
9148 4 2 /951899
014944 .• 9 9 9 2 4 9
014 9 4 6 ,-' 9 9 9 2 4 8
014 9 5 8 / 9 1 2 7 8 2
014952 / 9 5 91 8 9
014954 /112827
01485 6 / 9 5 9148
0148 6 9 / 912 7 9 2
914962 ,-' 9 9 9 9 8 2
814964 / 812 7 9 4
814966 ,-' 8 8 8 9 9 4
814 87 8 / 912 7 9 5
814872 / 9 5 9 2 9 9
014874 ,-' 9 9 5 9 2 7
814876 / 9 5 9 1 4 2
81418 8 ,-' 912 5 91
81418 2 t 4_ g| C -; "; ->
814184 / 9 5 914 9
81418 6 ,-' i 8 2 2
814119 /074127
814112 / 5 914 2
914114 / 9 2 4 9
814115 / 9 7 7 4 i 9
81412 9 /012727
814122 .-' 5 014 2
814124 / 5 2 9
814126 Z005227
814128 ,-' 01412 4
814122 /O05227
01412 4 / 01412 4
81412 6 Z077226
814148 Z077222
81414 2 ,-' 1 2 7 2 7
01414 4 ,••'052909
01414 6 ,-' 8 2 9 219
01415 8 ,••090127
814152 / 9 8 1 1 7 2
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APPENDIX F. - NOISE GENERATING PROGRAM




O14550 / 5 9 2
014552 /977102
014554 / 9 2 4 9
014556 / 912 7 9 9
014550 / 5 7
014562 /912746
014564 / 012 7 5
014566 / 912 7 4 6
014570 / 9 9 9 9 2 O
014 5 7 2 / 9 1 1 5 6 7
014574 / 9 9 9 9 2 6
014 5 7 6 /912794
014 6 / 1 7 7 2 9 4
014 6 2 ,•' 9 1 2 7 1
4
O14604 / 9 i 9 9 9
014 6 6 / 9 1 2 6 2 7
014 610 /177299
014612 ,-• 9114 5 7
014 614 / 9 9 9 2
014616 / 9 1 2 7 9 1
014 6 2 / 1 7 7 2 1
6
014522 / 9 1 2 7 9 2
01462 4 / 9 9 9 9 2 9
014 6 2 6 / 9126 2 4
0146 2 9 / 912 714
014622 / 9 e 9 4Q1
914 6 2 4 / 014 4 4 6
014626 / 9 6 2 7 1 6
014640 / 9 9 9 9 2
014 6 42 / 9 7 7 2 9 7
014644 Z995227
0146 4 6 / 9 9 9 9 9 9
014 6 5 / 9 9 1 4 1
014 6 5 2 / 911514
014 6 5 4 ,-' 9 9 5 9 4 4
0146 5 6 / 912 711
014659 /177775
914 6 6 2 / 9 9 5 7 2 4
914664 / 9 4 2 714
914 6 6 6 ,-' 9 9 9 9 91
9146 7 9 / 9 6 9 9 1 4
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/ 1 2 7 O O
,-'057000
/ 012 7O1
/ 2 2 O
/ 1 2 7 O 2
/ 0OO177
/ 012 7 2
/ O O O 2 O
/ O O 6 2 2
/ O 6 011
/077202
/ 5 7 21
/012702
/ 5




/ O 7 7 2 1
5
/ O O 012 7
/ O 1 1 7 2
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APPENDIX G. - DECODING PROGRAM FOR







































14 2 7 9
014272
914 2 7 4




/ 5 01 2
/ 6 2 7 2 7
.-' 5 81 9
(' 5 81 9 2
/ 812 7 81
/858184
/ 812 7 8 2
,••' 8 5 4 8 8 9
.-' 812 7 8 4
/ 8 8 8 817
/ 8 8 5 8 2 7
.-' 8 5 8116
/ 8118 8 5
.-' 8 7 418 5
/ 812 7 8 2
.-'888817
/ 8 8 6 2 8 5
,-' 8 8 5 5 2 7
,-' 8 5 8116
,-' 8 7 7 2 8 4
/ 8 2 2 7 2 7
/ 8 8 8 8 8 4
.-' 8 5 8116
/ 8 8 2 8 1
9
/ 9 9 6 2 91
/ 1 9 2 4 9 2
/877 421
.-' 9 8 9 4 9 7
,-• 9 6 2 7 81
,-' 8 8 9 9 9 2
/ 9 7 7 4 2 5
,-' 9 9 9 4 9 3
/ 9191 2 2
.-'995729
,'•' 9 9 9 4 9 2
/912722














































014 4 2 2
014 4 2 4
014426
014 4 2
014 4 2 2
014 4 2 4
014 4 2 6




/ O O 2 2 2 6
/ 8 O O 2 4 O
/ O 2 4 O
/00O24O
/ O O O 2 4 6
/ O12 7
/ 5 01O0
/ O12 7 01
/ 54 001
/ O12 7 2
/056 0OO
/ O O 5 O O 2
/ 5 4
,'11210 2
/ O O 5 2 01
/ 1 1 2 1 4
/ O O 5 2 1
/ O12 7 5
/ O O O O 5
/ 2 41
/ 10 510 2
/ 7 7 5 O 2
/ O12 7 5
,-• 4
,'106202
.-' 7 7 5 2
,
' O12 7 5
/ O O 8 O 5
/ 0O241
/ 10 61O4
/ 7 7 5 O 2
,-' O12 7 5
,-' 4
/ 18 6 2 4
,
" O77502
,-' O12 7 5
/ 5
/ O O 2 41
t' 10 610 4
/ 7 7 5O2
/ O74204
t 110 4 2 2
/ O 7 7 O 4 O
/ O O 1 2 7
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